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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
due process of law, and that this is no less true where the failure stems from
an ordinance initiated and sponsored by the sovereign people themselves.'
TAXATION-FLORIDA CLASS C INTANGIBLES TAX CONSTRUED
AS A PRIVILEGE EXCISE
Petitioner, a Delaware corporation, sought a peremptory writ of mandamus
ordering the Comptroller to refund a Class C Intangible Personal Property
Tax I which it was required to pay as a condition precedent to recording a mort-
gage. The company had its principal place of business in Florida and owned
real property in Florida, including that covered by the mortgage. The debt
was represented by a note held by a New York insurance corporation, payable
in New York, and secured by the mortgage on Florida real estate. Held, over-
ruling State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gay,2 that the Class C tax is
an excise on the privilege of recording the mortgage rather than an ad valorem
tax, and that neither domicile nor business situs is necessary. The motion for
writ was refused. State ex rel. United States Sugar Corp. v. Gay, Fla. Sup. Ct.,
Dec. 23, 1949.
Recent Supreme Court decisions 3 have somewhat abrogated the effect of
the maxim rnobilia sequuntur personan. 4 Today the courts uniformly uphold
the constitutionality of a state statute taxing intangibles where either a domicile
or a business situs are found within the state.6 And there is apparently sufficient
jurisdiction to tax if the state has afforded protection to or conferred benefits
upon the subject of the tax.? In the Seaboard case, supra, the Florida Supreme
Court construed the Class C tax as imposing an ad valorem levy upon the debt
itself, holding that since there was no domicile or business situs within Florida
there was no jurisdiction to tax.7
In the instant case, the statutes 8 were held to impose an excise on the
privilege of recording the mortgage. 9 No mortgage may be enforced unless this
9. Berman v. Denver, supra, at page 770.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.02(3), 199.11(3) (Cum. Supp, 1947).
2. 160 Fla. 445, 35 So2d 403 (1948).
3. State Tax Conm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless,
307 U.S. 357 (1939).
4. Movables follow the person.
5. E.g., Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
6. See, e.g., Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, supra at 492; State Tax
Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, supra at 180; Curry v. McCanless, supra at 367.
7. Accord, State ex reL. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949).
8. See note I supra.
9. This construction would seem to be preferred despite the designation by the
legislature that the Class C levy is an "Intangible Personal Property" tax. The C tax is
to be paid only once, upon recording, and not annually as are most ad valorem taxes.
Middendorf v. Goodale, 202 Ky. 118, 259 S.W. 59 (1923). But cf. Wheeler v. Weightman,
96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977 (1915). In addition, payment is not compulsory but optional.
Crosland v. Federal Land Bank, 207 Ala. 456, 93 So. 7 (1922), revzd on other grounds,
261 U.S. 374 (1923). Still another construction might have made this a tax on the mortgage
itself. See (1948] ANNUAL SuRvEy or AMRzaIcAN LAw 239 n.57.
CASES NOTED
tax has been paid and the instrument recorded.1 0 It would seem that the state
should be able to demand a quid pro quo in return for permitting a non-resident
mortgagee the protective remedy and advantages of enforcement.1 And if the
lender does not desire the security and privileges which the Florida courts may
bestow, he need not record and this tax will not be required.' 2
This change in construction was not entirely unexpected.' 8 It had been
recommended both as a means of increasing the revenue producing ability of
the intangibles tax 11 and as a more accurate connotation of the legislative de-
sign.15 It does seem, however, that this modification should have been per-
formed by the legislature and not by the court. While, in a strict sense, this can-
not be termed judicial legislation, the feasibility of two so varied interpretations
of the same statutes by the same court is wholly undesirable. Taxpayers are
entitled to a more secure knowledge of when they will be required to pay taxes
and how much they will be required to pay. It appears that much of the present
Florida tax legislation is inadequate and sorely in need of revision.' 6
TORTS-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-BACTERIA IN FOOD AS CAUSATION
Plaintiff relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, sought recovery under
a negligence statute 1 for death of her husband alleged to have been caused by
ptomaine poisoning as a result of eating in defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff es-
tablished through the undisputed testimony of two witnesses that two hours
after her husband ate he became violently ill, that he continued to suffer severe-
ly and that he was diagnosed two days later as having ptomaine poisoning. The
record is silent as to what the decedent had ingested, if anything, between the
time he ate and the time he was visited by the doctor, though it is clear that he
consumed nothing between the time he ate and the time he became ill. Six days
10. FLA. STAT. § 199.11(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
11. See note 6 supra.
12. The court, in the instant case, took judicial notice of the fact that the t lass C tax
is levied only when the mortgage is presented for recordation.
13. See Legis., Intangible Personal Property Tax; Limited Revenue Producing
Ability, 2 U. oi FLA. L. Rev. 262 (1949).
14. Id. at 272.
15. See (1948] ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERcAN LAW 239 n.57; note 9 s',P-,
16. See Bernstein, Property Exempt from Florida Taxation, I MI,.ri I. Q. 22, 35
(1947). "Each new Legislature adds to the tax machinery and in some instaie. 'he new
parts added do not fit well and hinder rather than assist the orderly functioning of the
machinery. Perhaps this situation could be remedied somewhat if the Legislat.re would
enact a law providing for the appointment of a Tax Commission, or a Tax Hnnrd, or a
Tax Council charged with the duty of making a study of the tax structure of 'e state,
and of all proposed tax legislation. This Commission should be composed] IJ ilt orneys
experienced in the tax field and could possibly work under the supcervi-i,, of the
Comptroller. The Commission could suggest the adoption of needed tax laws. A 11 .-roosed
legislative bills covering the field of taxation should be submitted to the c'ommission,
which could make recommendations and re-draft the bills so that they w~ll ' i'lto the
general tax scheme."
1. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1453 (1942).
